The Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), General Michael Langley, made headlines over the weekend when he linked the recent resurgence of terrorist attacks in Nigeria to the U.S. military’s withdrawal from key bases in Niger and Chad. Speaking during a digital press briefing after the “African Chiefs of Defence Conference” in Kenya, the Marine Corps General declared the Sahel as the new global epicentre of terrorism, warning that extremist groups in the region may soon gain the capacity to strike inside the United States. He was reported to have lamented that without bases in Niger and Chad; the U.S. could no longer effectively monitor terrorist activity in Africa. Insinuating that his country may not be able to adequately support Nigeria with intelligence and other critical information needed for its counterterrorism efforts. Langley also alleged that China’s growing engagement on the continent is purely extractive and self-serving. These comments, while striking, are as revealing in what they omit as they are in what they assert, and they deserve further scrutiny.
To be fair, General Langley raises valid concerns. The U.S. had historically supported regional counterterrorism initiatives in West Africa, particularly through intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) operations and joint military training programmes such as Operation Flintlock, Obangame and African Lion, amongst others. Therefore, it could be argued that departure of U.S. forces from Niger, Chad, Mali, and Burkina Faso has undeniably diminished coordinated responses to violent extremist organisations like Boko Haram, ISWAP and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), which now exploit the security vacuum in ungoverned spaces in the West African sub-region, Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. In Nigeria, especially in Borno, Benue and Plateau States, we’ve seen a disturbing resurgence of security threats manifesting in terrorists’ activities that have claimed hundreds of lives and displaced thousands in recent weeks. This might be connected to the absence of timely, actionable intelligence, possibly once facilitated through U.S. partnerships, which have played a role in these escalating attacks.
Yet, Langley’s narrative warrants closer interrogation. His assertions seem less about Nigeria’s security and more about reasserting U.S. strategic presence in the West African sub-region—potentially even soliciting the siting of new American military bases in Nigeria, as has been touted by several persons, though denied by the Nigerian government. This kind of messaging, while diplomatically subtle, aligns more with U.S. strategic interests than with a genuine reflection on past shortcomings. The claim that the U.S. provided robust intelligence support is contestable. During the peak of Nigeria’s Boko Haram insurgency, critical U.S. assistance, including intelligence, weapons and platforms, was either withheld or came too late. Notably, the A-29 Super Tucano aircraft, vital for close air support and counterinsurgency, arrived years after Nigeria made repeated requests and at a staggering cost. Worse still, these platforms were delivered with operational restrictions tied to U.S. human rights assessments, reflecting a conditional approach that undermined Nigeria’s sovereignty and urgency in responding to terror threats. The donated 24 Mine Resistant Armour Protected (MRAP) vehicles in 2016, valued at about $11 million by the U.S. to Nigeria, were largely unserviceable, requiring more than their cost value to make them useful.
In contrast, countries like Russia and China have stepped in with fewer strings attached. Russia has sold arms, helicopters and provided military training to several African countries, including Mali and Burkina Faso, where Wagner Group operatives now operate openly. China, through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has invested over $155 billion in African infrastructure since 2000, and while its security presence is limited, it has expanded military cooperation with nations like Djibouti (where it has a naval base) and Angola. According to a 2023 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia is now Africa’s largest arms supplier, accounting for 40% of major arms imports into the continent. These figures indicate not just a shift in alliances but a realignment of geopolitical influence. The message is clear: African countries are exploring alternative partnerships that promise support without the heavy conditionality often associated with the US and other Western nations.
For Nigeria, this moment is both a warning and an opportunity. While we cannot ignore the importance of U.S. expertise, intelligence and defence capabilities that could enhance our security, we must not become overly dependent or be drawn into the tug-of-war between global powers. Therefore, Nigeria must adopt a non-aligned, yet strategic foreign policy posture, forging relationships based on mutual respect and clear national interest. More importantly, we must double down on regional leadership, embark on constructive engagement with our West African neighbouring countries, and strengthen multilateral platforms like ECOWAS and also revitalise the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and invest more in indigenous intelligence capabilities. We must also hold ourselves more accountable by addressing the internal drivers of insecurity: governance issues, youth unemployment, ethno-religious divisions and weak institutions.
The recent surge in terror attacks across West Africa and the Sahel is real and disturbing, and so are the shifting global alliances around us. But in addressing these threats, Nigeria must not allow itself to be a pawn in the geopolitical chessboard of foreign powers seeking influence in Africa. Undoubtedly, addressing insecurity remains a critical challenge for Nigeria, impacting various aspects of our national life, from economic stability to social cohesion. Therefore, the evolving nature of these threats necessitates a multifaceted approach, combining robust domestic strategies with effective international collaboration. Consequently, the Nigerian government must look inward and further support its security forces. Encouragingly, we have recently witnessed a renewed vigour and notable successes by these forces in the northeast, north central and northwest regions. This momentum highlights the importance of sustained internal commitment, which needs to be commended, encouraged and supported. At the same time, the United States must also rethink its engagement model with African countries, particularly with nations like Nigeria that have demonstrated genuine commitment and sincerity of purpose in addressing their security challenges.
True partnership must be built on respect, responsiveness, and shared priorities, not just strategic calculations. In this new security reality, Nigeria’s path must be defined by sovereignty, self-reliance and smart diplomacy. Anything less would be a missed opportunity and a costly mistake.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Brigadier General S.K. Usman (rtd), mni fnipr fspsp, is a strategic communication and security expert and public relations consultant. He is active on social media platforms including Facebook, LinkedIn, X and YouTube, all under the handle ‘@skusman’
