Let us imagine that the opposition parties will boycott the forthcoming elections scheduled for next year. How will such a boycott affect the country and our democracy. And is boycott the best option?
Cameroun and Tanzania experienced election boycott by the opposition recently, but that has not affected the overall rating of the election results.
In year 2000, Cote D’Ivoire experienced a massive boycott by the opposition which resulted in 37.4% in participation. Same with Gambia Parliamentary election in 2002 and in guinea in 2003. Same with the Ivorian Presidential election in 2020.
The electoral boycott has become a regular tool for political opposition parties to use, especially since the end of the Cold War. With the rise of new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa, an increase in contested elections also has brought with it an increase in decisions to boycott. Whereas only four percent of all elections worldwide were boycotted in 1989, that number had risen to 15 percent by 2002. In the decade 1995-2004, an average of nearly 10 elections per year was boycotted.
The opposition to Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe also fractured over boycott discussions in 2005. That year, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) lost 16 seats in the parliamentary elections—in part because dithering over a possible boycott kept MDC registration numbers down. Following that setback, MDC leader Morgan Tsvangarai made the fateful decision to boycott the elections for the newly-created Senate, claiming that this body would be a rubber stamp for Mugabe. Not surprisingly, this created tension within the MDC as a sizable faction believed that choosing not to participate would be a fateful error. The party splintered, Tsvangarai lost his mandate, and the ruling ZANU-PF party captured 49 of 66 seats in the Senate election against the fractured opposition. Tsvangarai was able to patch things up by choosing to participate in the 2008 elections—resulting in near-parity in seats between the ZANU-PF and the MDC—but he undercut himself in the presidential election. In the first round, Tsvangarai actually outpaced Mugabe, but the government claimed that he fell short of the 50 percent threshold necessary to avoid a runoff. In protest, Tsvangarai decided to boycott the runoff election, allowing Mugabe to triumph handily, turning victory into setback. While the eventual power-sharing deal gave the MDC an unprecedented stake in the government, Tsvangarai’s boycott allowed Mugabe to retain the top governmental position.
Given the logistical preparations necessary to hold elections, opposition parties must be goaded into participation as early as possible to avoid missing registration windows or harming electoral chances. Too often, opposition parties come to the decision to participate too late to achieve the full effect. The threat of a boycott can pay dividends but the opposition parties still have to participate in order to receive the full benefits. Choosing to sit out is almost always a losing proposition.
First, if elections receive a great deal of attention from the international community, then a boycott can be effective. Thus, the opposition’s threat of an election boycott, when it attracts the attention of international audiences, increases international pressure on the incumbent. As a result, the ruler or ruling party is forced to make concessions. The most striking example of this is South Africa’s vote in 1994, when president of the Freedom Party Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s decision to boycott the election and denounce the electoral process as unfree and unfair, led to an increase of international pressure on Nelson Mandela. Consequently, the threat of boycotting the election by Buthelezi caused the abolishment of the single vote system, and amendments to the constitution with regard to local self-government.
Secondly, if boycotts are part of the opposition’s street protest campaign, then they can pay dividends. If the opposition enjoys strong domestic popular support and a boycott is also part of their overall campaign involving street protests and other activities, then these boycotts can yield results. An example of this is the 1996 election and opposition boycott in Bangladesh. The Awami League, an opposition party, launched massive protests that swept the country along with a boycott two days before election day. The general opposition’s boycott and ongoing street protests eventually pushed the government to hold a new election and the opposition faction managed to win that election.
The slogan “Boycott the boycottables” was first introduced to Nigeria political vocabulary by Chief Ojike Mazi Mbonu (1912-1956). The slogan was a rallying cry at that time for Nationalism. He did, in practice, generate greater enthusiasm for Nigerian traditional clothes by his “boycott” methods which involved a preference for traditional clothes as opposed to English -styled ones.
Chief Ojike did not introduce the slogans for people to boycott elections.
Chief Ojike was born in 1912 in Akeme in Arochukwu, Southern Eastern, Nigeria. He attended the Arochukwu Primary School, finishing in 1926 and taking up a teaching appointment with a mission. He returned to college in 1929 to train as a teacher at the Church Missionary Society (CMS) Training College in Waka. A brilliant student, he won the 1931 college annual prize which was a book— AGGREY OF AFRICA, the biography of the renowned Ghanaian educationist whose ideas of Pan-Africanism left a lasting influence on the young Ejike.
On leaving college in 1931, Ojike resumed teaching at the Central School in Abagana. In 1933 he resigned to join the staff of Dennis Memorial Grammar School in Onitsha, becoming one of the few African teachers on the staff.
His involvement in politics commenced in 1936 when organized a successful teachers’ salary strike after teachers were granted an increase which excluded junior members of the profession. He resigned from teaching in mission schools in 1938 in preference to private schools. That same year he met Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe with whom he established a long personal and political relationship.
Chief Ojike left for the United States of America in 1938 to continue his education at the Lincoln University. His stay there sharpened his political ideology for it was then that he came with other African students like Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Together they formed in 1941, the African Students Association of America and Canada to campaign against colonialism in Africa and injustices against the Black race in general. Chief Ojike was elected its first President.
His returned to Nigeria marked an active involvement in the nationalistic politics spearheaded by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had founded the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) and whose newspaper, the WEST AFRICAN PILOT, had become the vocal organ of the campaign for independence, Chief Ojike joined the NCNC and contributed articles to the PILOT.
In 1949, he was fined 40 pounds on a charge of sedition because of an article in which he criticized the colonial government for the shooting of 21 miners during a labour dispute at the Udi Coal Miners, near Enugu. In 1953, he was a member of the NCNC delegation to the London Constitutional Conference which paved way for Nigeria’s Independence in October 1960. The following year he won an election on the platform of the NCNC to the Eastern Region House of Assembly, becoming the Region’s Minister of Finance; he held that office until early 1956.
Mazi Ojike Mbonu died in 1956. There is now an Ojike Memorial Medical Centre at Arondizuogu, Imo State.
In 1979, the proprietor of the Medical Centre, Dr. Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe, a close friend of Chief Ojike honoured me by appointing me along with a journalist of respect, Mr. James Odafe Othinwa, as co-director of the medical centre.
In 1964, the word boycott was effectively used for the first time in the general election. Since then, there has been argument whether or not, boycott has any effect.
In 1964, the NPC returned 60 of its candidates unopposed, the NCNC at that time challenged the declaration by the NPC.
On August 20, 1964, the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was formed. The alliance was made up of the NPC, the leader, the NNDP controlling the government of Western Nigeria, the Mid-West Democratic Front, which formed an opposition in the Mid-Western Region and some other elements including the dynamic party of Dr. Chike Obi.
On June 3, 1964, the United Progressive for Grand Alliance (UPGA) was formed. The alliance was made up of NCNC and the Action Group. The political enmity became apparent before and after the 1964 election.
The UPGA was opposed for returning 60 candidates as unopposed including the Prime Minister, the Minister for Home Affairs, Alhaji Shehu Shagari at Sokoto West; the Minister of Economic Development, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, at Konduga-Mafa, and the former Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, Alhaji Abdul Razak, at Ilorin Town.
To this the Eastern Region Attorney-General, Mr. Christopher Mojekwu, who was on a fact-finding tour of Northern Nigeria, said that for various reasons 60 UPGA candidates in the Northern Region had been unable to file their nomination papers. It later emerged that more NPC men were being returned unopposed in the North, by virtue of Northern Progressive Front candidates withdrawing in such seats as Yerwa, where the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Alhaji Zanna Buka Dipcharima was the candidate; and in the seats of the Speaker of the Federal House, Alhaji Jalo Waziri (Gombe Central), and the Federal Minister of Works, Alhaji Inua Wada (Sumailia)
On December 21, 1964, the Central Working Committee of NCNC rejected the 61 unopposed candidates in the North. Secretary F. S. McEwen said “we do not regard these seats as won by the NPC,” adding that the party had decided on a “course of Action.” Action Group protested against the two NNDP unopposed candidates in Ife.
Dr. Okpara NCNC leader and Eastern Premier described election arrangements as a “farce.” Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the ten Prime Minister described the NCNC as a “great liability to UPGA,” said that if they lost the election, they would blame the AG.
On December 22, the Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission, Mr. E. E. Esua admitted in an emergency broadcast that there had been cases where more than one candidate had been validly nominated “and yet names of candidates have been announced as returned unopposed.” He appealed to all those unauthorized to make announcements on behalf of the Commission to desist from doing so. Alhaji Dauda Adegbenro of UPGA led a delegation to President Nnamdi Azikiwe to postpone the election. NPC warned the UPGA not to drag the President into “politics”.
The tug of war between NNA and UPGA led to the fear of the boycott of the election by UPGA. Two members of Mr. Esua’s Commission, Prince Akenzua and Mr. Anthony Aniagolu resigned. Mr. Anthony Nnaemezie Christopher Aniagolu (1922–2011) later became Justice of the Supreme Court and also chaired the 1988–1989 Constituent Assembly.
On December 30, a “partial” election took place with “brisk voting” in the North, “moderate” in the West, where there had been some destruction of polling booths, very limited in Lagos, where booths had also been destroyed and one man was injured in a riot, and non- existent in the East, where the UPGA boycott was complete. In the evening, UPGA issued a statement saying it would not accept any government formed on the basis of the elections which would be “compromising and evil”. It called on the then President Nnamdi Azikiwe to summon a conference of all political leaders to “break up the Federation peacefully.” The NPC held a meeting at State House, Marina, Lagos, with President Azikiwe and the objective was to preserve Federal Unity.
On January 1, 1965, President Nnamdi Azikiwe, a non-executive President in Parliamentary system of Government announced that “attempts are being made to bring about a compromise on the question of forming a government.” The text of the broadcast distributed to the Press, showed that the President had originally decided, in order to “arrest a situation which is rapidly deteriorating” not to exercise his constitutional power in calling upon any individual to form a Government, and that he would rather resign.
In my view, what will save our present political situation is to arrange for a free and fair election in the immediate future. All Nigerian patriots must hang their heads in shame today. The first national post-independence general election has been the signal for assaults on the Constitution and various acts of lawlessness hitherto unknown in the history of his country. As President of Nigeria, it is my view that the disruptive forces prevailing in the country constitute a situation which cannot be tolerated any longer.
The all-embracing question is: do we wish to disintegrate as united country, every region forming part of the Federation going its own separate way, or do we wish our country to be strong and united—a country that should command respect in the comity of nation? I should be falling in my duty as President of this great nation if I were to act literally on the results of this election. My honest opinion is that it would reopen old wounds, exacerbate feelings, prolong bitterness, and hasten the exist of unity and democracy from our beloved nation.”
On January 2, 1965, while the NCNC announced that all its successful candidates had resigned their seats in Parliament, the NNA took the line that where elections had been conducted, they were valid and that by-elections should only be held in the Eastern Region constituencies, where no voting had taken place. Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said that any complaints about improper conduct of the lections should be made to the law courts, and proposed that a conference of all Regional Governments should be held “to avoid bloodshed.”
On January 4, 1965, the President announced after further consultations, that the Constitution left him no alternative but to call on the outgoing Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, to form a new Government which would be of “broadly based national” character. Stating that he was prepared to subordinate his own personal feelings, Dr. Azikiwe declared that the Prime Minister and he had resolved their differences and were agreed that “the validity of elections can be questioned only by due process of law;” that in those constituencies where elections had not been held, arrangements should be made to hold them as soon as possible; that in Western Nigeria, where the boycott had affected the voting, “the results, in the interests of democracy, should be re-examined;” and that a review of the Constitution and the electoral machinery would take place.
Sir Abubakar immediately confirmed that he would form “a broadly based Government” representing all shades of opinion. He said completion of outstanding elections in the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions, as well as in Lagos, arrangements would be made to bring in new Ministers and to make a general reassignment of all Ministries.
On January 13, 1965, the Ministers in Sir Abubakar new government were sworn-in by the President. Chief Okotie-Eboh and Dr. Mbadiwe the two NCNC Ministers were not at the main swearing-in. On the 14th January, Chief Okotie-Eboh was sworn-in. At a Press conference, Dr. Mbadiwe said he boycotted the ceremony because he was waiting for his UPGA colleagues to join the government.
On January 18, 1965, the NCNC announced after a meeting in Enugu, that they had “rededicated themselves to the maintenance of democracy in Nigeria” and would give the new Federal Government “a fair trial;” the meeting however, was not attended by Chief Theophilus Benson. The Action Group, after a meeting at Ibadan, similarly decided not to defy Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa any further.
Reactions to the list were immediate. Chief Ladoke Akintola, Premier of Western Region and the leader of the NNDP, the NPC’s ally in the NNA, said that there had been no NNDP ministers in the first list because his party had decided not to released any names “until the whole list had been completed and adequate opportunity given to all the patriotic elements now working to assure the fullest unity of the people of Western Nigeria and Lagos in particular and the Federal Republic in general.”
On January 6, 1965, Dr. Okpara stated that new elections would be held in the Eastern Region as soon as possible and that, if the UPGA received an invitation to join the Federal Government, it would give it “careful consideration.”
The following Ministers were sworn-in on January 7, 1965 by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. They were Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa(NNA)—Prime Minister and External Affairs, Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu (NNA)—Defence, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh (UPGA)—Finance, Alhaji Muhammadu Inuwa Wada (NNA)—Works and Surveys, Alhaji Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (NNA)—Commerce and Industries and Transport, Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NNA)—Internal Affairs and Communications, Alhaji Yusufu Maitama Sule (NNA)—Mines and Power, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (NNA)—Economic Development and Education, Alhaji Musa Yar’Adua (NNA)—Lagos Affairs, Dr. Taslim Olawale Elias (formerly NCNC)—Attorney-General and Justice, Dr. M.A. Majekodunmi (no party affiliation)—-Health and Information, Chief J.C. Obande (NNA)—Establishments and Labour and Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe (UPGA)—Aviation.
Others were Alhaji Nuhu Bamali (NNA), Alhaji Usman Maitambari (NNA), Alhaji Hashim Adaji (NNA) and Alhaji Ibrahim Tako (NNA)—all Minister of State.
The boycott of 1964 election was averted because of the personal intervention of Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, the then President and because the politicians knew the futility of the boycott.
My advice to the opposition parties is not to boycott. Choosing to sit out is almost a losing proposition. Threaten but participate. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Teniola, former director at the Nigerian Presidency, writes from Lagos.
